Original article published November 5, 2026, at 11:33 (UTC+8).
A compromised hardware signer can try to leak secret-key information through the nonce it chooses for an ECDSA signature. As the original article explains, the device could encode information in the nonce public key; once signatures appear on-chain, an attacker could scan them and gradually reconstruct the private key. A secure host or an air-gapped device alone would not prevent this channel.
The anti-klepto protocol limits the signer’s control over that nonce. The host wallet contributes random nonce material, then checks—using the elliptic-curve distributive property—that the final nonce public key includes the host’s contribution. The article also discusses a commitment mechanism and describes implementation in BitBox02 firmware and wallet software, including open-source collaboration.
Source: learnblockchain.cn (originally published 2026-11-05 11:33 UTC+8)


